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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
CaseNo.20090854-CA
vs.

LUCIA ARNOLD & VANESSA
ARNOLD,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-4-103(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the Appellants were denied the assistance of competent trial counsel as

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment when counsel failed to recognize that the State had
opened the door to the admission of important evidence that the trial court had previously
excluded pursuant to Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. This Court
reviews an ineffectiveness claim, raised for the first time on appeal, as a question of law.

1

State v. Cox, 2007 UT App 317,113, 169 P.3d 806 (quoting State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25,
f 6, 89 P.3d 162). "To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, '[Djefendant
must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment' and that 'counsel's deficient
performance was prejudicial-i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case.'" State v. Cox,
2007 UT App 317 at \ 20 (quoting State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, % 19, 12 P.3d 92
(citation omitted)).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or
by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which
is not relevant is not admissible.

Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Lucia Gomez Arnold and Vanessa Lucia Arnold appeal from the judgment and

sentence of the Honorable Gary D. Stott and David M. Moretensen, Fourth District
Court, after their convictions for retail theft, a third degree felony.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Lucia Gomez Arnold and Vanessa Lucia Arnold were charged by criminal

information filed on May 15, 2008 in Fourth District Court with; Count 1 - Retail Theft,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-602 and 76-6-412; Count 2
- Retail Theft, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-602 and
76-6-412. (R. 6-5).1 The information was amended on June 19, 2008, to strike Count 2.
(R. 18-17; 17-16).
At a preliminary hearing on August 21, 2008, Appellants established that the
State's witnesses, former Deputy Sheriff Kris Hendricksen and Officer Douglas
Stradling, were acquainted with former Deputy Sheriff Skip Curtis, and alleged that these
witnesses had falsified evidence against Appellants in retaliation for a personal injury
lawsuit filed by Appellant Vanessa Arnold against Skip Curtis. (Transcript of

1

The two cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal, however, each defendant has
her own pleadings file. When the index numbers in each file differ, the first number will
refer to Lucia's file and the second to Vanessa's. The transcript citations are the same for
both appellants.
3

Preliminary Hearing, 21:7-11; 22:5-17; 70:17-25; 71:1-13). The trial court ruled that
evidence concerning the lawsuit against Skip Curtis was irrelevant for purposes of the
preliminary hearing, and the charges were bound over for trial. (Transcript of
Preliminary Hearing, 22:18-25; 23:1-6; R. 29; 2).
On May 22, 2009, four days before trial, the State filed a motion in limine to
exclude all evidence of Vanessa Arnold's lawsuit against Skip Curtis under Utah R. Evid.
402 and 403. (R. 129-121; 128-120). Appellants did not make a written response.
The trial court heard argument on the motion on the morning of the first day of
trial, May 26, 2009. (R. 135; 134). Appellants proffered testimony that after
apprehending Appellants, Hendricksen and Stradling verbally identified Appellant
Vanessa Arnold as "the individual that sued Skip Curtis." (Transcript of Jury Trial, 5:34). Appellants also proffered that, while transporting Appellant Vanessa Arnold to the
Utah County Jail, Stradling drove to a location where Skip Curtis was waiting.
(Transcript of Jury Trial, 5:5-17). Skip Curtis opened the door of Stradling's patrol car,
put a gun to Appellant Vanessa Arnold's head, and instructed her to terminate the lawsuit
against him. (Transcript of Jury Trial, 5:9-17).
Appellants argued that this evidence, together with evidence establishing the
lawsuit filed by Appellant Vanessa Arnold against Skip Curtis, was relevant to the issue
of credibility of the State's witnesses. (Transcript of Jury Trial, 6:7-25; 7.) Nevertheless,
the trial court granted the State's motion to exclude the evidence under Utah R. Evid. 402
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and 403, and ordered that Appellants were not, in any way, to refer to Skip Curtis, the
lawsuit against Skip Curtis, or the incident alleged to have taken place as Appellant
Vanessa Arnold was being transported to the Utah County jail. (Transcript of Jury Trial,
10:18-25; 11-13; 14:1-4.)
At trial, Appellants complied with the Court's order, and limited their defense to
an allegation of a random conspiracy to falsify evidence against Appellants. (Transcript
of Jury Trial, 281-334.) During cross-examination of Appellants, the State focused on
the apparent lack of a motive for the conspiracy, posing questions such as "Mr.
Hendrickson (sic), he really wants to hurt you, doesn't he?" and "Officer Stradling of the
Provo Police Department is trying to hurt you, isn't he?" (Transcript of Jury Trial,
300:17-25; 301-304; 330:25; 331-333; 334:1-4.) Despite these questions, Appellants'
trial counsel failed to seek release from the trial court's order excluding evidence of the
Skip Curtis lawsuit.
The trial jury found Appellants guilty of retail theft. (R. 171; 170, 155).
On June 9, 2009, Appellants filed a motion to arrest judgment, alleging that the
trial court erred in excluding evidence relating to the Skip Curtis lawsuit, and that
Appellants were prejudiced because the trial court's order prevented them from truthfully
answering the State's cross-examination questions regarding a motive for the alleged
conspiracy against Appellants. (R. 175-174; 210-209). The State responded on July 9,
2009. (R. 195-185; 186-177). The trial court ruled that the State's cross-examination
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had opened the door to evidence relating to Skip Curtis, but that any claim of prejudice
had been waived because Appellants' trial counsel failed to raise the issue or seek release
from the court's order at trial. (R. 197; 193).
On September 10, 2009, Appellants were sentenced to probation and were ordered
to spend 30 days in the Utah County Jail with GPS monitoring, and to pay a fine. (R.
224-222; 215-13).
On October 2, 2009, Appellants filed notices of appeal with the Fourth District
Court. (R. 234; 220). This Court subsequently consolidated their cases into a single
appeal. (R. 238; 224).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On May 7, 2008, Scott McDermeit a security officer for the Dillard's store at the
Provo Towne Center mall in Utah County, observed Appellants Lucia and Vanessa
Arnold shopping at Dillard's via a security surveillance camera. (Transcript of Jury
Trial, 99:3-25; 100:1-16.)

2.

McDermeit observed Appellants enter the dressing rooms with a large number of
items in their arms, and carrying large plastic bags. (Transcript of Jury Trial, 100:13-16;
101:23-24; 103:13-16.) McDermeit testified that, over a period of approximately an hour
and fifteen minutes, he observed Appellant Lucia Arnold exit the dressing room two or
three times, return a few items to the racks, and re-enter the dressing room with a large
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number of additional items. (Transcript of Jury Trial, 103:16-25; 14:1-20.)
3.

McDermeit testified that when Appellants finally exited the dressing rooms
\

together, their bags appeared to be full, and they did not return some of the items that
they had carried into the dressing rooms to the racks. (Transcript of Jury Trial, 105:1417.) McDermeit asked another Dillard's security officer, Kris Hendricksen, to stop the
Arnolds. (Transcript of Jury Trial, 104:21-25; 105; 106:1.)
4.

Hendricksen, accompanied by Dillard's manager Arloha Sutherland, confronted
Appellants, and asked them to accompany him to the manager's office. (Transcript of
Jury Trial, 167:10-13.) Once inside the manager's office, Hendricksen accused
Appellants of shoplifting. (Transcript of Jury Trial, 167:18-20.) Hendricksen and
Sutherland testified that Appellants' bags contained shoeboxes with string tied around
them, and inside the shoeboxes were multiple pieces of tightly rolled Dillard's clothing.
(Transcript of Jury Trial, 168:8-17; 200:13-25; 201:1-4.) Hendricksen testified that he
did not find any receipts or proof of purchase labels for the clothing. (Transcript of Jury
Trial, 169:7-22.)

5.

Appellants testified that they did not conceal clothing inside of their shoeboxes,
but that the shoeboxes contained shoes that were to be returned to other stores.
(Transcript of Jury Trial, 282:8-14; 293:19-23; 320:9-12; 323:19-25; 324:1-4.) They
testified that when they were taken to the manager's office, Hendricksen dumped some
clothing out onto the floor, and Hendricksen and Sutherland produced price tags from a
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desk drawer and added them up. (Transcript of Jury Trial, 291:24-25; 292:1; 293:24-25;
294:1-8; 324:9-25.)
6.

Sutherland testified that the total value of the items found inside Appellants'
shoeboxes was $1,049. (Transcript of Jury Trial, 208:15.)

7.

Hendricksen advised McDermeit that he had recovered stolen merchandise from
Appellants. (Transcript of Jury Trial, 127:21-25.) McDermeit then called the Provo
Police Department. (Transcript of Jury Trial, 127:21-25.)

8.

Officer Douglas Stradling responded from the Provo Police Department.
(Transcript of Jury Trial, 233:10-24.) Stradling testified that Appellants were speaking
Spanish, which he did not understand, and so he moved Appellant Vanessa Arnold into
an adjacent office. (Transcript of Jury Trial, 237:7-25; 238, 239:1-14.) Stradling
testified that Appellant Vanessa Arnold resisted, and so he took her to the ground and
handcuffed her. (Transcript of Jury Trial, 238:3-25; 239:1-14.) Stradling also
handcuffed Appellant Lucia Arnold. (Transcript of Jury Trial, 240:7-18.) Stradling
searched Appellant Vanessa Arnold, and found car keys in her pocket. (Transcript of
Jury Trial, 240:25; 241:1-8.)

9.

Appellants testified that Hendricksen and Stradling verbally and physically abused
them. (Transcript of Jury Trial, 294:14-25; 295-298; 299:1-12; 325; 326:1-17.)

10.

Stradling radioed dispatch and asked for a Spanish speaking officer. (Transcript
of Jury Trial, 239:24-25.) Officer Brad Partridge responded. (Transcript of Jury Trial,
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263:6-18.) Stradling gave the car keys to Officer Partridge, and asked him to find
Appellants' car in the parking lot and look through the car windows for other evidence.
(Transcript of Jury Trial, 243:5-8.)
Partridge testified that he and McDermeit located Appellants' car and observed
clothing rolled up in the back seat. (Transcript of Jury Trial, 264:13-25; 265:1-13.)
Stradling then went out to the car and seized the clothing. (Transcript of Jury Trial,
243:17-25; 244:1.) Stradling checked with Dillard's employees, but the clothing in the
car did not belong to Dillard's. (Transcript of Jury Trial, 244:8-14.)
Stradling determined that there was probable cause to support retail theft charges,
and took Appellants into custody. (Transcript of Jury Trial, 236:5-6; 239:6-14; 240:721.) Officer Stradling transported Appellant Vanessa Arnold to the Utah County jail, and
Officer Partridge transported Appellant Lucia Arnold to the Utah County jail. (Transcript
of Jury Trial, 244:19-25, 245:1-5.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should vacate Appellants' convictions for retail theft and remand for a
new trial because Appellants' trial counsel was ineffective. Trial counsel is ineffective
when trial counsel makes an omission, where 1) there is no tactical advantage to be
gained by the omission; and 2) absent the omission, there was a reasonable probability of
a more favorable result. See State v. Cox, 2007 UT App 317, 169 P.3d 806.
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In this case, trial counsel failed to seek release from the trial court's order
excluding evidence of Vanessa Arnold's lawsuit against Skip Curtis after the prosecutor
opened the door to the evidence. There was no tactical advantage justifying this
omission, as the evidence was necessary to provide a motive for the conspiracy alleged
by Appellants. Furthermore, there was a reasonable probability of a more favorable
result if the evidence had been omitted, since it provided a motive for what otherwise
appeared to be an allegation of a random conspiracy to frame Appellants for retail theft.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS' TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE HE FAILED TO
SEEK RELEASE FROM THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER EXCLUDING EVIDENCE
CRITICAL TO THE APPELLANTS' THEORY OF THE CASE AFTER THE STATE
HAD OPENED THE DOOR TO ITS ADMISSION
This Court should vacate Appellants' convictions for retail theft and remand for a
new trial because Appellants' trial counsel was ineffective. Trial counsel is ineffective
where 1) trial counsel's performance is deficient, in that it falls below a reasonable
standard of professional judgment; and 2) trial counsel's deficient performance is
prejudicial, in that it affects the outcome of the case. State v. Cox, 169 P.3d 806, 811-813
(Utah App. 2007) (citing State v. Litherland, 12 P.3d 92, 99 (Utah 2000) (citing
Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984))); State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 41,
48P.3d931,940.
10

A. Trial Counsel's Performance Fell Below a Reasonable Standard of Professional
Judgment
Appellants' trial counsel's performance fell below a reasonable standard of
professional judgment because there was no tactical advantage to be gained by trial
counsel's failure to seek release from the Court's order excluding evidence relating to
Skip Curtis. Trial counsel's performance falls below a reasonable standard of
professional judgment when trial counsel makes an omission, and there is no tactical
advantage to be gained by the omission. State v. Cox, 2007 UT App 317, 169 P.3d 806.
In Cox, the defendant was convicted of the aggravated sexual abuse of his
stepchild. Id. at f 1. The sole aggravating factor alleged by the State was that the
defendant occupied a position of special trust as the victim's stepparent. Id. at % 22.
Although the statute in effect at the time of the alleged abuse specifically excluded the
role of stepparent as a position of special trust, the trial judge erroneously instructed the
jury that the defendant occupied a position of special trust as the victim's stepparent. Id.
at ^f 16. The defendant's trial counsel failed to object to the erroneous instruction. Id. at
1119.
This Court held that there was no tactical advantage to be gained by trial counsel's
failure to object to the erroneous instruction, and thus trial counsel's performance fell
below a reasonable standard of professional judgment. Id. atffl[21-22. The Court noted
that the State had alleged only one aggravating factor, and if trial counsel had objected to
the jury instruction defining a position of special trust as a stepparent, the State would
11

have been forced to go back to the beginning of the prosecution. Id. at ^ 22; see also
State v. Marble, 2007 UT App 82,ffl[20-21, 157 P.3d 371 (trial counsel's stipulation to a
position of special trust as an aggravating factor not ineffective assistance where the State
could have relied on a second alleged aggravating factor, and trial counsel's stipulation
limited the jury's exposure to potentially damaging evidence).
In this case, there was no tactical advantage to be gained by trial counsel's failure
to seek release from the trial court's order after the State had opened the door to evidence
of the Skip Curtis lawsuit. Trial counsel's strategy was to attack the credibility of the
State's witnesses, and to allege a conspiracy to retaliate against Appellants for the
personal injury lawsuit filed by Appellant Vanessa Arnold against Skip Curtis.
Trial counsel cross-examined the State's witnesses at the preliminary hearing
concerning a conspiracy to retaliate against Appellants for the Skip Curtis lawsuit.
(Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, 21-22; 23:1-10; 70:17-25; 71:1-13.) Trial counsel
argued against the State's motion in limine to exclude evidence of the Skip Curtis lawsuit
and to exclude evidence of the incident alleged to have taken place as Appellant Vanessa
Arnold was being transported to the Utah County jail. (Transcript of Jury Trial, 4:19-25;
5-7.)
At trial, trial counsel alleged a conspiracy against Appellants in his opening
statement. (Transcript of Jury Trial, 87:3-21.) Trial counsel called both Appellants as
witnesses, and they testified that they believed there was a conspiracy to frame them for
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shoplifting. (Transcript of Jury Trial, 291:17-25; 292-299; 300:1-11; 322:20-25; 322327; 328:1-2.) Trial counsel focused on the conspiracy in his closing argument.
(Transcript of Jury Trial, 370:12-25; 371-375; 376:1-5.) After losing at trial, trial counsel
submitted two motions to arrest judgment based on the trial court's exclusion of evidence
relating to the Appellant Vanessa Arnold's lawsuit against Skip Curtis. (R. 181-174;
218-217.)
Thus, trial counsel's failure to seek admission of evidence relating to Appellant
Vanessa Arnold's lawsuit against Skip Curtis after the State had opened the door to it was
a serious error, and was not the kind of "sound trial strategy" that trial counsel has the
latitude to implement on behalf of his clients. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 689 (1984). Therefore, trial counsel's performance fell below a reasonable standard
of professional judgment.2
B. Trial Counsel's Deficient Performance Affected the Outcome of the Case
Because It Prevented Appellants from Presenting Evidence of the Motive for the
Alleged Conspiracy Against Them.
Appellants' trial counsel's performance was prejudicial, because a reasonable
probability exists that the jury would have acquitted Appellants, had the jury been
presented with evidence of a motive for the alleged conspiracy to falsify evidence against
Appellants. Trial counsel's deficient performance is prejudicial if a reasonable
probability exists that, but for the deficient performance, a more favorable outcome

2

We note that Appellants' trial counsel, S. Austin Johnson, was publicly reprimanded
four times in the November issue of the Utah Bar Journal, Vol. 23 No. 6, 57-58.
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would have been obtained at trial. State v. Greuber, 2007 UT 50, 165 P.3d 1185; State v.
Clark, 2004 UT 25, 89 P.3d 162.
In this case, there is a reasonable probability that Appellants would have been able
to obtain a more favorable outcome at trial if they would have been able to present
evidence relating to Appellant Vanessa Arnold's lawsuit against Skip Curtis. In light of
the trial court's order excluding this evidence, Appellants' trial defense was limited to a
bare allegation that Kris Hendricksen, Officer Stradling, and others had conspired to
falsify evidence against Appellants for no reason.
Appellants inability to produce evidence of a motive for this conspiracy
considerably weakened the credibility of Appellants' testimony and arguments. The
State took advantage of this weakness, focusing heavily on the apparent lack of a motive
for the alleged conspiracy in both its cross-examination of Appellants and its closing
argument. (Transcript of Jury Trial, 300:17-25; 301-304; 330:25; 331-333; 334:1-4;
357:13-15; 359:5-14; 360:21-25; 361:1-10; 379:6-9). In fact, it was the State's focus on a
lack of a motive for the conspiracy that led the trial court to conclude that the State had
opened the door evidence relating to Appellant Vanessa Arnold's lawsuit against Skip
Curtis. (R. 197.)
Considering the totality of the evidence before the jury, the absence of evidence
concerning Appellant Vanessa Arnold's lawsuit against Skip Curtis lawsuit had "a
pervasive effect on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire
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evidentiary picture." State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14,1f 86, 152 P.3d 321 (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694). That effect is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the
trial. See Taylor v. State, 20Q7 UT 12, f 60, 156 P.3d 739 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 694). Thus, trial counsel's failure to seek release from the trial court's order excluding
evidence of Appellant Vanessa Arnold's lawsuit against Skip Curtis lawsuit was
prejudicial, and trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Lucia and Vanessa Arnold ask that this Court reverse their convictions for retail
theft because they were denied their constitutional right to competent counsel.
DATED this 8th day of November, 2010.

MARGARET P. LINDSA^f
MATTHEW R. MORRISE
Counsel for Appellant
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